business cycle)? What are the distributional consequences of such regulation, for firms, governments, or for individual households? As an allocational system, finance necessarily creates winners and loser. Some firms, households or governments are rewarded with funding and rents, and others are not. The terms under which debtors receive loans can vary between burdensome and easy. Who are the winners and losers? What conflicts remain latent, and which ones become explicit (for example, the monetary politics of the nineteenth-century populist era in the US reflected strong tensions between debtors and creditors)? How are the disputes that inevitably occur resolved, deflected, repressed or mitigated?
The development of finance expands new roles that sometimes cross-cut the traditional roles emphasized within political economy; instead of just employers and employees, or capitalists and workers, we have investors and borrowers, and debtors and creditors. The conflicts and alliances produced in these new role sets do not simply reproduce the old ones. Defined-contribution pension funds, 1 for example, have turned millions of American workers into investors (Cotton Nessler & Davis, 2012) . Does such a change alter their dispositions or even turn them into capitalists (or, in the US context, into supporters of the Republican party)? In many countries, the goal of home ownership turns working families into debtors as they borrow heavily in order to purchase a home. In some countries, graduate education can turn students into debtors as they borrow to fund their studies. How does this matter? What happens when "capitalists" (especially financial "capitalists") borrow heavily, leveraging themselves or their firms in order to maximize profitability, but doing so in ways that make them highly vulnerable to losses? Do these roles reinforce each other, compromise each other, or contradict each other? Who regulates the financial regulators, i.e., how is the financial system itself regulated? This is clearly one of the purposes of modern central banks, but they are often joined by a network of regulatory agencies operating at both the national and international levels. What is the logic of regulation (e.g., does it primarily emphasize compliance or deterrence, is it principles-based or command-and-control)? Where is the locus of regulation (public vs. private, profit vs. non-profit, centralized and top-down versus dispersed and bottom-up, local, national, or global)? Is the regulator accountable and to whom (clearly this depends on the locus)? What are the means of regulation? That is, what kind of bureaucratic capacities, informational resources, and legal or extra-legal powers undergird effective regulation, both public and private? If moral suasion exemplifies "soft" regulatory power, then the right to compel testimony under oath and in a court of law represents a much "harder" power. Do these means and loci vary depending on the kind of financial market being regulated or is the same regulatory model applied across the board (e.g., consider the differences between organized derivatives exchanges and the over-the-counter derivatives market, or between debt vs. equity markets)?
Significant moments of "auto-regulatory" change include shifts in organizational governance that affected the capitalization of financial institutions. Many stock exchanges, for example, were "de-mutualized" in the late twentieth-century and turned into publicly traded corporations. The same was true of derivatives markets like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and Chicago Board of Trade. US investment banks shed their old partnership structures and became publicly traded corporations. This latter shift allowed the managers of firms like Goldman Sachs to work with other peoples' money, but also made them more beholden to short-term share prices, and therefore more willing to undertake risky actions that may be problematic in the long run and which risk the firm's reputation (Davis, 2009; Morrison & Wilhelm, 2008) . Other kinds of financial markets, like the over-the-counter derivatives market, evaded public regulation even as they attracted a huge volume of profitable trading activity and investment (Stout, 2011) .
How does regulation evolve over time? Is change largely crisis-driven? Does it tend to be incremental or dramatic (perhaps following the "punctuated equilibrium" model)?
2 If financial regulation involves the application of rules, where do the rules come from? Who interprets them or ensures compliance? Is this a special skill, a form of expert knowledge? What distinguishes financial expertise, and how does it articulate with other systems of expertise (e.g., the legal profession and the accounting profession)? The establishment and maintenance of expertise always raises the kinds of jurisdictional issues discussed by Abbott (1988) in his book on the system of professions, so expertise is itself a sphere of contention. Furthermore, the creative elaboration of rules prompts financial innovation, as those who are regulated employ expertise to detect and exploit various loopholes and ambiguities, or undertake activities that escape the purview of formal rules (witness the emergence of "shadow banks" or the expansion of "off balance sheet" activities; see Sunder, 2011) . And how to reconcile this new regulatory perspective with older social science literatures that distinguished between bank-based and market-based systems of finance (Zysman, 1983; Allen & Gale, 2000; Woo, 1991) , which proposed ideas about the effects and likelihood of regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974) , or which underscored the significance of financial hegemony (Mintz & Schwartz, 1985) ? The "discreet" quality of finance as a regulator suggests an affinity with the Carnegie School approach to organizational decisions (March & Simon, 1958) , with its focus on how the premises of decision-making are set. Boundedly rational managers frame the choice-sets of their subordinates, and grant them a measure of constrained autonomy. Hence, influence is indirect. Similarly, bankers set out a restricted menu of financial options for their clients, although the latter decide which one to pursue.
As a social practice, finance is distinctively abstract, able to render qualitatively distinct economic activities and undertakings into a common quantitative framework, commensurated through a common monetary denominator. Production, distribution and consumption can all be represented symbolically, as values, discounted cash flows, net present values, contingent claims and obligations, debits and credits. The symbols can then be manipulated, using arithmetical operations, or entered into higher order mathematical formulae, as part of a rule-governed calculative exercise that creates various kinds of "bottom lines" and performance measures. Quantitative representations thus provide a type of cognitive regulation, through which decisions are shaped by how things are measured, and by what is readily measurable. Often, these numerical representations create a false precision that sits uneasily atop intractable ambiguities and unstable uncertainties that occasionally explode upward and sweep away the calculative veneer. But when the ambiguities merely "rumble," rather than "explode," it is a world tailor-made for "quants." Furthermore, it is world capable of accommodating social imperatives, variously defined depending on one's brand of socially responsible investing. Screens, prohibitions, prescriptions, scorings all offer ways to shape finance "socially." Indeed, some now offer a new performance metric, the social rate of return.
For as much as it already contains, much else can be drawn out of the book. It contains a number of richly detailed and insightful papers on various aspects of finance. But it also offers the possibility of a larger research program that rethinks the many ways in which modern finance functions as a discreet regulator.
